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Introduction
BY CAROLYN S. BRATr*
0n July 19, 1998, America will celebrate the 150th anniversary
of the Seneca Falls Convention. Almost three hundred women
and men including Lucretia Mott,' Elizabeth Cady Stanton2 and Freder-
ick Douglass3 met on that July date in 1848 at Seneca Falls, New York,
for a two-day discussion of the "social, civil and religious rights of wom-
an."4 At the conclusion of the meeting, sixty-eight women and thirty-two
men signed their names to a Declaration of Sentiments5 and this
country's organized women's rights movement began.
The Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments identified and enumerat-
ed the grievances of American women at the midpoint of the nineteenth
century.6 It set the agenda, and it has served as the blueprint, for the
women's rights movement in this country for almost one hundred and
fifty years. At the time of its issuance, the most controversial provision
of the Declaration was its call for women's suffrage. Lucretia Mott
* W.L. Matthews, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of
Law. B.A. 1965, State University of New York at Albany; J.D. 1974, Syracuse
University.
' Born in 1793 on Nantucket Island, Massachusetts, Lucretia Mott became
a teacher, a Quaker minister and an abolitionist. It was under her tutelage that
Elizabeth Cady Stanton began a life-long quest to secure equality of rights for
women. ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE 71-72 (1975).
2 Born in 1815 in Johnstown, New York, Elizabeth Cady Stanton was an
abolitionist, author of the Declaration of Sentiments, and, along with Susan B.
.Anthony, the organizer of the Nationa1 Woman Suffrage Association. Id. at 72,
74-75, and 155.
' Thought to have been born into slavery in 1817, Frederick Douglass
became an abolitionist leader and publisher of an abolitionist paper The North
Star in Rochester, New York. Id. at 76.
4 THE HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE (Elizabeth Cady Stanton ed., 1881)
quoted in FLEXNER, supra note 1, at 74.
5 FLEXNER, supra note 1, at 77.
6 The Declaration ofSentiments was the product of the collaborative efforts
of Jane Hunt, Martha Wright, Mary Ann McClintock, Lucretia Mott, and
Elizabeth Cady Stanton. Id. at 74.
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feared that including such a demand would make the Declaration's
signatories look "ridiculous."7 Henry B. Stanton, the husband of
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, left town during the convention because he
objected to the presentation of a resolution calling for women's suffrage.8
Among Elizabeth Cady Stanton's friends and acquaintances, only Freder-
ick Douglass supported her plan to include a call for women's right to the
elective fianchise in the resolutions submitted to the convention.9 It took
seventy-two years to secure the vote for women, 10 and only one woman
who attended the Seneca Falls Convention lived to vote under the
nineteenth amendment to the United States Constitution." The irony of
the controversy surrounding the decision to seek the vote for women is
that today suffrage for women is the only resolution adopted by the
Seneca Falls Convention that everyone agrees has been completely
achieved.
The Declaration of Sentiments was the earliest, systematic, public
articulation in the United States of the ideas that fuel the quest for
women's economic, political, social, and legal equality to this day. In
recognition of the enduring importance of this conference to women qua
women, a group of researchers at the University of Kentucky came
together early last summer to discuss an appropriate and meaningful way
to celebrate the sesquicentennial of the Seneca Falls Conference. As
direct beneficiaries of the women's rights movement, these researchers
wanted to make their own contribution to that centuries long struggle.
They decided to create a symposium issue for the Kentucky Law Journal
that examines contemporary aspects of problems that were first identified
in the Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments. 2
Other law reviews will no doubt publish essays and articles, or even
symposia, on the sesquicentennial of the American women's rights
movement. In all likelihood, however, this symposium issue will make a
unique contribution: one-half of the contributors are trained in academic
disciplines other than the law. All of the contributors subscribe to the
7 Id. at 76.
8 Id. at 75.
9 Id. at 76.
10 The Nineteenth Amendment, ratified on August 26, 1920, provides: "The
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of sex." U.S. CONST. amend. XIX,
§ 1.
"FLEXNER, supra note 1, at 76.
12 Reprinted in this issue at 84 Ky. L.J. 713 (1995-96) [hereinafter
Declaration of Sentiments].
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proposition that a unidimensional assessment of the current status of
American women can not adequately capture the complexities of the
issues involved in the continued unequal treatment of women in this
country. The contributors all shared the understanding that the most
intractable problems women face are found at the intersections of gender,
race, and class. Therefore, each legally trained author was paired with a
scholar who was trained in another academic discipline. In either
companion or co-authored articles, they then explored facets of an issue
that they identified as important to the achievement of women's quest for
full equality.
Those who attended the Seneca Falls Convention and subscribed to
its Declaration of Sentiments understood that the struggle for economic
equality 3 was of central and enduring importance to the goal of full
social, political, and legal equality for women. They knew that the
relative economic well-being of woman determined her ability to
exercise her legal guarantees of civil and political equality. 4 Ann R.
Tickamyer,15 a sociologist, and Susan L. Waysdorf,'6 a law professor,
use their companion articles to explore various dimensions and manifesta-
tions of the economic plight of contemporary American women.
The Declaration of Sentiments expressly drew attention to the
inequities in employment that women confronted. It provided that "He
has monopolized nearly all the profitable employments, and from those
she is permitted to follow, she receives but a scanty remuneration."' 7
Patricia Cooper," a labor historian, examines the public discourse about
women and work since the nineteenth century while a companion article
13 There are numerous provisions in the Declaration of Sentiments that
address aspects of the lack of distributive justice for women. For example, "He
has taken from her all right in property, even to the wages she earns."
Declaration of Sentiments, supra note 12, at 713, 7.
14 I am reminded of an a popular aphorism that succinctly sums up crucial
nature of economic equality. "Beggars can't be choosers."
15 Ann R. Tickamyer, Public Policy and Private Lives: Social and Spatial
Dimensions of Women s Poverty and Welfare Policy in the United States, 84 Ky.
L.J. 721 (1995-96).
16 Susan L. Waysdorf, Fighting for Their Lives: Women, Poverty, and the
Historical Role of United States Law in Shaping Access to Women s Health
Care, 84 KY. L.J. 745 (1995-96).
'7 Declaration of Sentiments, supra note 12, at 714, 11.
18 Patricia Cooper, "A Masculinist Vision of Useful Labor" Popular
Ideologies About Women and Work in the United States, 1820 to 1939, 84 KY.
L.J. 827 (1995-96).
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by Mary O'Melveney, 9 a labor lawyer, explores the issue of affirmative
action and gender in the employment context. Susan J. Scollay, a
professor of educational administration, and Carolyn S. Bratt, a law
professor, contribute a co-authored article20 on the limitations of
reasoned discourse and data-based argumentation as a catalyst for the
attainment of gender equity for women employees of American colleges
and universities.
The lack of meaningful educational opportunities for women at the
time the Declaration of Sentiments was promulgated was reflected in its
provision that "He has denied her the facilities for obtaining a thorough
education, all colleges being closed against her."' Today, although the
doors to the academy are open to women as students, not all women who
pass through them benefit equally from those educational opportunities.
Darlene C. Goring,22 a law professor, and Beth L. Goldstein,' an
educational anthropologist, use companion articles to report on a
qualitative investigation they undertook of gender and race issues that
arise in law school academic support programs.
The propounders of the Declaration of Sentiments also knew that a
large measure of woman's oppression flowed from what we now refer to
as the "socialization" of girls and women. They insightfully complained
that, "He has endeavored, in every way that he could, to destroy her
confidence in her own powers, to lessen her self-respect, and to make her
willing to lead a dependent and abject life."'24 In a co-authored article,'
Louise Everett Graham, a law professor, and Geraldine Maschio, a theater
management professor, examine how cinematic images of women lawyers
are a window into contemporary cultural notions about what women
9 Mary K. O'Melveney, Playing the "Gender" Card: Affirmative Action
and Working Women, 84 KY. L.J. 863 (1995-96).
20 Susan J. Scollay & Carolyn S. Bratt, Reflections on the Limitations of
Rational Discourse, Empirical Data, and Legal Mandates as Tools for the
Achievement of Gender Equity in American Higher Education, 84 KY. L.J. 903
(1995-96).
2 Declaration of Sentiments, supra note 12, at 714, 12.
22 Darlene C. Goring, Silent Beneficiaries: Affirmative Action and Gender
in Law School Academic Support Programs, 84 KY. L.J. 941 (1995-96).
23 Beth L. Goldstein, Little Brown Spots on the NotebookPaper: Women as
Law School Students, 84 KY. L.J. 983 (1995-96).
24 Declaration of Sentiments, supra note 12, at 714, 16.
25 Louise Everett Graham & Geraldine Maschio, A False Public Sentiment:
Narrative and Visual Images of Women Lawyers in Film, 84 KY. L.J. 1027
(1995-96).
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ought to be. Terry Birdwhistell,26 the University of Kentucky Archivist,
contributes oral histories of two women law school graduates (one black
and one white) that shed light on how individual women both internalize
and reject societal messages concerning appropriate female behaviors and
roles.
Clearly, the subtext of the Declaration of Sentiments was that if
women gained "admission to all the rights and privileges which belong
to them as citizens of the United States," '27 a fundamental alteration of
American society would occur. In her contribution to this symposium,2"
Lynn Hecht Schafran, Director of the National Judicial Education
Program, explores how women's increasing participation in the legal
profession has contributed to the on-going process of reshaping the law
to reflect women's concerns and experiences. The companion article2 9
of Penny Miller, a political scientist, assesses the uneven impact wom-
en have had on Kentucky's political culture. In a co-authored article, 0
Joan C. Callahan, a philosopher, and Dorothy E. Roberts, a law professor,
demonstrate, in the context of reproduction-assisting technologies, how
a feminist social justice approach would alleviate the continued fail-
ings of contemporary liberal theory to adequately address the inequi-
ties women experience because of issues of gender, race, and class.
The Declaration of Sentiments is a truly extraordinary document
authored by a small group of women who exhibited amazing prescience.
At the time it was promulgated, the Declaration was a forceful and
insightful exposition of the grievances of women living in that male-
dominated, male-normed society. One hundred fifty years later, its words
and ideas continue to resonate with all those who read it. Nonetheless, the
drafters were not omniscient. They did not recognize all the facets of
women's second class citizenship, and they could not predict all the
possible permutations of women's oppression. The final two companion
articles in this symposium explicate one such example of the limitations
of Declaration of Sentiments - its failure to address issues of securing
26 Terry Birdwhistell, "Some Kind of Lawyer": Two Journeys from
Classroom to Courtroom and Beyond, 95 KY. L.J. 1075 (1995-96).
27 Declaration of Sentiments, supra note 12, at 714, 17.
2 Lynn Hecht Schafran, Women Shaping the Legal Process: Judicial
Gender Bias as Grounds for Reversal, 84 KY. L.J. 1153 (1995-96).
29 Penny M. Miller, Staking Their Claim: The Impact of Kentucky Women
in the Political Process, 84 KY. L.J. 1163 (1995-96).
'0 Joan C. Callahan & Dorothy E. Roberts, A Feminist Social Justice
Approach to Reproduction-Assisting Technologies: A Case Study on the Limits
of Liberal Theory, 84 KY. L.J. 1197 (1995-96).
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justice and equality for women that transcend national borders. Kathi L.
Kern,3 an historian, examines the first meeting of the International
Council of Women convened in 1888 by the National Woman Suffrage
Association to acknowledge the fortieth anniversary of the Seneca Falls
Convention. Margaret Plattner,32 a lawyer who attended the 1995 United
Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China, reports
on the international straggle to secure women's rights as human rights.
The symposium closes with two student pieces. The wage disparities
between women and men identified in the Declaration of Sentiments have
not been eradicated by the prohibitions in the Equal Pay Act of 196331
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"4 against pay differentials
based on the sex of the employee. Neither statute reaches to sex-
segregated occupations where wage differentials are most acute because
of the historic undervaluation of women's work. Rhonda J. Blackburn
analyzes the efficacy of the Fair Pay Act of 1994 as a tool for closing the
one hundred fifty year-old gap between women's and men's compensa-
tion.35 Kendra Samson's contribution to this symposium also explores
a facet of employment discrimination that has not been adequately
addressed by the courts.36 She argues that Title VII permits the imposi-
tion of individual liability on agents of an employer when they engage in
prohibited acts of sex discrimination.
31 Kathi L. Kern, "The Cornerstone of a New Civilization ": The First
International Council of Women and the Campaign for "Social Purity", 84 KY.
L.J. 1235 (1995-96).
32 Margaret Plattner, The Status of Women Under International Human
Rights Law and the 1995 UN World Conference on Women, Beifing, China, 84
Ky. L.J. 1249 (1995-96).
33 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988).
34 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
" Rhonda J. Blackburn, Note, Comparable Worth and the Fair Pay Act of
1994, 84 Ky. L.J. 1277 (1995-96).
36 Kendra Samson, Note, Does Title VII Allow for Liability Against
Individual Defendants?, 84 Ky. L.J. 1303 (1995-96).
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